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	<title>Comments on: Eclectic Decision Theory</title>
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		<title>By: Itzhak Gilboa</title>
		<link>http://conlaw.jotwell.com/eclectic-decision-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-145</link>
		<dc:creator>Itzhak Gilboa</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Nov 2009 12:18:52 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Two brief bibliographic comments:

-- This paper was prepared for the Annual Reviews in Economics;
-- David Schmeidler, who was my advisor, was the first to suggest a general-purpose, axiomatically-based decision theory that generalized the classical one (expected utility with subjective probabilities).

On rationality: the (admittedly odd) notion of subjective rationality is designed to facilitate discourse in decision theory, and it may be of no use in the legal domain.  Surely the law is interested in subjective terms much less than decision theory is.  (This parallels the distinction between classical and Bayesian statistics.)  But perhaps subjective rationality may have some counterparts in questions of sanity and moral responsibility?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Two brief bibliographic comments:</p>
<p>&#8211; This paper was prepared for the Annual Reviews in Economics;<br />
&#8211; David Schmeidler, who was my advisor, was the first to suggest a general-purpose, axiomatically-based decision theory that generalized the classical one (expected utility with subjective probabilities).</p>
<p>On rationality: the (admittedly odd) notion of subjective rationality is designed to facilitate discourse in decision theory, and it may be of no use in the legal domain.  Surely the law is interested in subjective terms much less than decision theory is.  (This parallels the distinction between classical and Bayesian statistics.)  But perhaps subjective rationality may have some counterparts in questions of sanity and moral responsibility?</p>
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		<title>By: michael webster</title>
		<link>http://conlaw.jotwell.com/eclectic-decision-theory/comment-page-1/#comment-25</link>
		<dc:creator>michael webster</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2009 13:45:46 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Gilboa has a very odd definition of subjective rationality which entail that recalcitrant individuals are more rational than thoughtful individuals.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Gilboa has a very odd definition of subjective rationality which entail that recalcitrant individuals are more rational than thoughtful individuals.</p>
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